This paper studies a mechanism design model of financial intermediation. There are two informational frictions: agents receive unobservable shocks and can participate in markets by engaging in trades unobservable to intermediaries. Without regulations, intermediaries provide no risk sharing because of an externality arising from arbitrage opportunities. We identify a simple regulation --a liquidity requirement --that corrects such an externality by affecting the interest rate on the markets. We characterize the form of the optimal liquidity adequacy requirement for a general class of preferences. We show that whether markets underprovide or overprovide liquidity, and whether a liquidity cap or a liquidity floor should be used depends on the nature of the shocks that agents experience. Moreover, we prove that the optimal liquidity adequacy requirement implements a constrained efficient allocation subject to unobservable types and trades. We provide closed form solutions for the optimal liquidity requirement and welfare gains of imposing such requirements for two important special cases. In contrast with the existing literature, the necessity of regulation does not depend on exogenous incompleteness of markets for aggregate shocks. Abstract This paper studies a mechanism design model of …nancial intermediation. There are two informational frictions: agents receive unobservable shocks and can participate in markets by engaging in trades unobservable to intermediaries. Without regulations, intermediaries provide no risk sharing because of an externality arising from arbitrage opportunities. We identify a simple regulation -a liquidity requirement -that corrects such an externality by a¤ecting the interest rate on the markets. We characterize the form of the optimal liquidity adequacy requirement for a general class of preferences. We show that whether markets underprovide or overprovide liquidity, and whether a liquidity cap or a liquidity ‡oor should be used depends on the nature of the shocks that agents experience. Moreover, we prove that the optimal liquidity adequacy requirement implements a constrained e¢ cient allocation subject to unobservable types and trades. We provide closed form solutions for the optimal liquidity requirement and welfare gains of imposing such requirements for two important special cases. In contrast with the existing literature, the necessity of regulation does not depend on exogenous incompleteness of markets for aggregate shocks.
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answer several important questions. Can markets provide the correct amount of liquidity? What is a precise nature of market failure if such exists? Can a regulator design a simple policy to improve on the allocations provided by competitive markets alone? The questions of public versus private provision of liquidity, limits of the markets in the provision of liquidity, and the role of government in regulation of …nancial intermediation has been a subject of considerable volume of recent research.
Most notably, Holmstrom and Tirole (1998) and Allen and Gale (2004) study models of provision of liquidity in the presence of either informational or enforcement frictions.
We study a mechanism design model of …nancial intermediaries as providers of liquidity similar to Diamond and Dybvig (1983) and Allen and Gale (2004) . In our setup, agents receive unobservable taste shocks. 1 Intermediaries invest in short and long term assets and o¤er a risk-sharing contract that pools risk across agents. An environment in which the only informational friction is unobservability of agents'types is well analyzed in the literature. It is easy to show, as in Prescott and Townsend (1984) and Allen and Gale (2004) , that markets provide optimal allocations, and, therefore, there is no role for government intervention.
The focus of this paper is on an environment in which there is an additional informational friction: consumers can trade assets unobservably on a private market by engaging in hidden side trades. Since the contribution of Jacklin (1987) , the possibility of agents engaging in hidden side trades has been recognized as an important constraint on the provision of liquidity by …nancial intermediaries. 2 Unobservability of consumption arising from a possibility of such trades is a realistic and signi…cant friction a¤ecting liquidity. It is di¢ cult, if not impossible, for an individual …nancial intermediary to control the exact use of funds or consumption of an agent or preclude a …rm from engaging in bene…cial trades with other …rms in the economy. A di¤erent interpretation of unobservability of consumption is non-exclusivity of contracts. It is di¢ cult for an individual …nancial intermediary to preclude an agent to enter in additional risk sharing contracts with other intermediaries. Possibility of hidden trades can signi…cantly worsen and even eliminate risk sharing.
For example, Jacklin (1987) and, more recently, Allen and Gale (2004) showed that absent any government regulations, in an environment with unobservable trades, intermediaries provide no risk sharing. Allen and Gale (2004) then conclude that, in the absence of aggregate shocks and incompleteness of the markets for aggregate risk, there is no regulation that can improve upon the market equilibrium.
In contrast to the literature, we propose and analytically characterize a simple intervention that can improve upon the market allocations. We propose imposing a liquidity requirement that stipulates either the minimal (liquidity ‡oor) or the maximal (liquidity cap) amount of liquidity -holdings of the short asset -for an intermediary. Such regulation a¤ects the interest rate on the hidden trade market, relaxes incentive compatibility constraints, and improves welfare. Im- 1 Agents in our setup can be also thought of as as …rms or entrepreneurs experiencing shocks to their productive opportunities. The interpretation of our environment as a model of …rms makes the paper similar to the setup of liquidity provision in the productive sector by Holmstrom and Tirole (1998) . 2 The importance of access to credit markets as a constraint on the optimal program was also emphasized by Allen (1985) and Chiappori, Macho, Rey, and Salanie (1994) .
portantly, we also show that the optimal liquidity adequacy requirement implements the e¢ cient allocation in which the social planner is constrained by the unobservability of agents'types and the possibility of hidden trades. Therefore, the optimal liquidity adequacy requirement is not just the best requirement within a particular class of interventions, i.e. within a class of liquidity adequacy requirements. It is also an intervention that allows to achieve the highest possible welfare subject to these two information frictions. We identify a reason for the market failure -an externality in which intermediaries do not internalize how liquidity they provide a¤ects other intermediaries via the possibility of trades on private markets. Importantly, this externality exists even when there are no aggregate shocks. This contrasts with the conclusions of Holmstrom and Tirole (1998) and Allen and Gale (2004) that the government has a role in regulating liquidity only if there are aggregate shocks.
A technical contributions of the paper is an analytical characterization of the optimal liquidity regulation in terms of easily interpretable wedges and determination of the form of the optimal regulation (liquidity cap or liquidity ‡oor) for a general speci…cation of preferences. We also provide a closed form solution for the optimal regulation in two cases: for a setup with logarithmic utility and for the environment studied by Diamond and Dybvig (1983) .
We prove that the particular form of preference shocks one assumes is crucial to determine the direction of the optimal liquidity requirement. The intuition for why a liquidity requirement improves upon a competitive market allocation is that it a¤ects prices (interest rates in our case) on private markets. In short, a change in the interest rate a¤ects the deviating agent who simultaneously claims a di¤erent type and engages in hidden trades more than an agent who truthfully announces his type, therefore, relaxing the incentive compatibility constraints. The direction of the deviation depends on the speci…cation of the preference shocks. In the case of the liquidity shocks, a deviating agent wants to save. A liquidity ‡oor reduces the interest rate and makes borrowing less attractive. In the case of discount shocks, a deviating agent wants to borrow. A liquidity cap increases the interest rate and makes saving less attractive.
Our model suggests practical implications for regulation of …nancial intermediation. Various types of intermediaries or di¤erent regions in a country, depending on the primary nature of the shocks that the agents whom they serve experience, should have di¤erent forms of liquidity regulations. There are two appealing features of liquidity requirements that make it suitable for policy implementation. First, it is simple to implement as it speci…es only how much liquidity intermediaries should hold in the …rst versus second period. Intermediaries are then left to determine how they service their individual consumers without any additional government intervention. Second, it does not shut down private markets. Rather, aggregate manipulation of liquidity endogenously changes the interest rate on these markets.
We structure the paper to follow the discussion of equilibria and e¢ ciency concepts progressing from less constrained to more constrained problems. The least restrictive program is an optimal allocation subject only to feasibility constraint SP 1 -in this setup, there is no private information.
We then characterize a competitive equilibrium CE 2 and a constrained e¢ cient allocation SP 2 in which the only informational friction is unobservable types. As we discussed above, the welfare achieved by CE 2 is equal to welfare achieved by SP 2 . We then describe a competitive equilibrium CE 3 for the case when types are unobservable, and agents can also engage in hidden trades. We characterize the form of the optimal liquidity adequacy requirement depending on the speci…cation of preferences. We then show that the optimal liquidity adequacy requirement implements the constrained e¢ cient allocation SP 3 in which a planner is constrained by two informational frictions -private types and hidden trades. Generically, welfare is higher in the solution to SP 3 than welfare achieved by competitive markets CE 3 . For an important special case, considered in Diamond and Dybvig (1983) and Jacklin (1986) , competitive equilibria without regulations imply no risk sharing and autarchic allocations while the optimal liquidity adequacy achieves welfare of the unconstrained problem SP 1 (in fact, the solutions to all three programs SP 1 , SP 2 , and SP 3 coincide in this particular case). 3 Our paper uses the mechanism design framework of an important paper by Allen and Gale (2004) to analyze the model of intermediation in the presence of private markets. Our results in the model with private markets di¤er signi…cantly from their work. The result of Allen and Gale (2004) that an equilibrium is ine¢ cient relies on exogenously imposed incompleteness of markets for trades among intermediaries when there are aggregate shocks. In the absence of incomplete markets for aggregate shocks or in the absence of aggregate shocks, Allen and Gale (2004) conclude that there is no role for regulation of liquidity or any other regulatory intervention. We show that a liquidity requirement can improve upon the competitive equilibrium by eliminating above described externality even when there are complete markets for aggregate shocks or when there are no aggregate shocks. The mechanism of how liquidity requirements a¤ects interest rates on private markets and the characterization of the optimal liquidity adequacy requirement is new to the literature on the provision of liquidity by …nancial intermediaries. Moreover, we provide a theoretical characterization of the optimal liquidity adequacy requirement for a general speci…cation of shocks and closed form solutions for two important cases.
Relationship to the literature
Our paper shares a common goal with the work of Allen and Gale (2004) in studying whether laissez-faire markets provide too little or too much liquidity and whether a speci…c policy interven- 3 We use terminology SP 1 , SP 2 , and SP 3 to correspond to what in the literature is, somewhat imprecisely, called …rst-, second-, and third-best problems. The advantage of our notation is that we clearly de…ne constraints that a social planner faces. 4 For a survey of the literature see Freixas and Rochet (1997) and Gorton and Winton (2002). tion that occurs at an aggregate level can be Pareto improving or even optimal. Both of the papers direct regulations at intermediaries rather than individual consumers. A government regulates intermediaries while intermediaries on their own solve incentive problems via direct interactions with consumers.
Holmstrom and Tirole (1998) provide a theory of liquidity in a model in which intermediaries have borrowing frictions. Similar to our paper they do not assume incomplete markets. In their model, a government has an advantage over private markets as it can enforce repayments of borrowed funds while the private lenders cannot. They show that availability of government provided liquidity leads to a Pareto improvement when there is aggregate uncertainty. The role of the government in our model is to correct an ine¢ ciency arising because of an externality associated with private information and possibility of hidden trades. In our paper, in contrast with Holmstrom and Tirole (1998) and Allen and Gale (2004) , a liquidity requirement improves upon a market allocation even when there is no aggregate uncertainty.
Our paper also di¤ers conceptually from the seminal paper of Jacklin (1987) . That paper compares a competitive equilibrium with private markets CE 3 to the social optimum without private market SP 2 which is, essentially, equivalent to the statement that prohibition of private markets leads to a Pareto improvement. In our paper, we …nd the optimal liquidity requirement and show that it implements the solution of the social planner's problem who is faced with both unobservable types and private markets SP 3 which, for this speci…cation of preferences, coincides with SP 1 and SP 2 . In contrast with Jacklin, there is no need to prohibit private markets to achieve superior or even unconstrained allocations. A regulator can impose a liquidity adequacy requirement that achieves such optimal allocations. (2006) is on the models of money and on implementation of the optimum and advantages of various policy interventions. In his model, a speci…cation of technology for intertemporal transfer of resources allows him to consider tradeo¤s of various policy interventions. Another paper that is related to our results in the Diamond-Dybvig setup is Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2003) . They develop a model of an emerging market crisis in which there is a market for external borrowing and a domestic private market. The domestic market in their model is similar to the private market in our formulation. They show that the equilibrium coincides with the optimal allocation in the presence of private markets. They further
show that a range of …nancial instruments including liquidity requirements and taxes on external borrowing can implement the optimal allocation without private markets that coincides with the full information optimum. In our general model, a competitive equilibrium with the optimal liquidity adequacy requirement is di¤erent from the competitive equilibrium without private markets and, therefore, is di¤erent from unconstrained "…rst-best" allocation. However, we show that in a special case of the Diamond and Dybvig (1983) environment, the optimal liquidity regulation implements the unconstrained optimum.
While the focus of this paper is on the models of …nancial intermediation, we also contribute to the literature on optimal taxation in the presence of hidden trades 5 . In particular, Golosov and Tsyvinski (2006) study an optimal dynamic Mirrlees taxation with endogenous private markets.
There are two main di¤erences between our paper and their work. The …rst di¤erence is conceptual.
In Golosov and Tsyvinski (2006) Related is a recent paper by Albanesi (2006) that studies a model of entrepreneurship and …nancial assets. The focus of that paper is on an implementation of the optimal program with observable consumption as a competitive equilibrium with taxes in which agents can trade multiple assets. She derives a general result on di¤erential asset taxation in such models.
In Diamond (1997) , as in our paper, the optimal allocation is di¤erent from autarky. His result relies on the assumption that some consumers are exogenously restricted from participating in private markets. Unlike that paper, in our model all consumers can participate in markets.
An elegant paper by Bisin and Rampini (2004) justi…es an institution of bankruptcy in a model of non-exclusive contracts. In their work, borrowers (entrepreneurs) have an access to secondary markets. A possibility of default on these secondary contracts worsens return to hidden borrowing and lending and yields a Pareto improvement.
One justi…cation for reserve requirements is found in the existence of deposit insurance. The rationale given is usually as follows: deposit insurance encourages risk taking behavior of intermedi- 
Model
We consider a standard mechanism design model of …nancial intermediation similar to Diamond and Dybvig (1983) and closest to Allen and Gale (2004) . The economy lasts three periods (t = 0; 1; 2)
and is populated by a continuum of ex-ante identical agents, or investors.
There are two assets (technologies) in the model. The short asset is a storage technology that returns one unit of consumption good at t + 1 for each unit invested at t. Investment in the long asset has to be done at t = 0 to yieldR units of the consumption good at t = 2. The utility function u( ; ) is assumed to be concave, increasing, and continuous for every type .
We also assume a single crossing property:
Assumption 1 (Single crossing):
In the paper we are primarily interested in studying three types of preferences: discount factor shocks, liquidity shocks, and valuation-neutral shocks. We also provide a complete characterization of the model for the fourth set of preference described in Diamond and Dybvig (1983) and used in Jacklin (1987) .
In this case, agents di¤er by how much they value second period consumption. The …rst feature of these preferences is that a planner would like to allocate a relatively higher amount of second period consumption to an agent with a higher shock . The second feature of these preferences is also important to our results. Consider two agents who are allocated the same consumption In this case, low , i.e., a high liquidity shock, is a shock that makes consumption at date 1 particularly valuable. Similar to the case of the discount shocks, the second feature of these preferences is that an agent with lower has a higher lifetime utility of consumption than an agent with lower . 6 Up to now, we have modelled liquidity and discount shocks as preferences shocks, or in other words, consumption opportunity shocks. We now discuss how we can think of the model as an environment in which …rms or entrepreneurs face investment opportunity shocks. The outline of such an extension is as follows. Suppose there is a continuum of investors with identical CARA utilities:
for some common discount factor : Agents are committed to …nance a …xed size -normalized to 1 -investment opportunity paying outR at date 2 and learn their type at date 1: It can be easily shown that this model is isomorphic to our model of discount factor shocks with = exp( (R + 1)):
Imagine now that an entrepreneur is committed to …nance a project with a known returnnormalized to one -at date 2: They learn the exact resources needed for this investment,q , at date 1: It is now easy to see that this model is isomorphic to our model of liquidity shocks with = exp (1 +q ) : We can therefore interpret agents receiving taste shocks as investors receiving investment opportunity shocks.
Example 3 Valuation-neutral shocks: Letû (c) = c 1 1 and
Ifû (c) = log (c), then
In this case, agents di¤er in how valuable their consumption is across periods, but the second feature of the preferences that we described above is absent here, and all agents value the lifetime consumption stream equivalently. Note that in the case of the log utility, there is no need to normalize preferences byR, and valuation-neutral preferences do not depend on technology. 6 A natural question arises whether uility speci…cation of liquidity shocks 1 û (c1) +û (c2) is a renormalization of the discount shocksû (c1) + û (c2), and that by dividing utility in the case of discount shocks by we would arrive to the model with liquidity shocks. It is true that both of preferences have the same marginal rates of substitutions. However, the preferences are di¤erent in the direction of the levels of lifetime levels of utilities. In the case of liquidity shocks, it is low that gives an agent a higher lifetime value of consumption. In the case of dicount factor shocks, it is exactly the opposite -high leads to high lifetime value of consumption.
Example 4 Diamond-Dybvig preferences. Let 2 f0; 1g and 1 > >R 1 :
In the case of Diamond-Dybvig preferences, agents are of two types: those who need to consume in the …rst period, and those who are indi¤erent between consuming in the …rst and the second period.
We begin by assuming that there is no aggregate uncertainty. The timing of the events is as follows. At t = 0, all individuals are (ex-ante) identical. At t = 1, each consumer gets an i.i.d.
draw of his type. The probability distribution of being an investor of type is denoted by F ( ).
We assume that the "law of large numbers"holds, and that the cross-sectional distribution of types is the same as the probability distribution F . One can, therefore, interpret F ( ) as the number of agents of type below . The realization of a consumer's type is private information. Each consumer has an endowment of e units of a consumption good at time t = 0, and no endowment at dates 1 and 2.
We denote byfc 1 ( ) ; c 2 ( )g an allocation of consumption across consumers. An allocation is feasible if it satis…es the feasibility constraint given by
We do not impose a sequential service constraint so there are no bank runs in our model. We also restrict our attention to pure strategies. In what follows, we also consider symmetric equilibria.
4 Benchmark: equilibrium and constrained e¢ cient allocation without private markets
In this section, we de…ne and characterize a competitive equilibrium for the economy without private markets for hidden trades. In this environment, agents are allocated with consumption allocations depending on their types. Agents cannot engage in any unobservable transaction, and their consumption is therefore observable.
De…nition of equilibrium CE

2
Consider a market with a continuum of intermediaries. We assume throughout the paper that all activities at an intermediary level are observable. In period 0, before the realization of idiosyncratic shocks, consumers deposit their initial endowment with the intermediary. An intermediary agrees to provide a stream of consumption fc 1 ( ) ; c 2 ( )g. These contracts are o¤ered competitively, and there is free entry for intermediaries. Therefore, consumers sign a contract with the intermediary that promises the highest ex-ante expected utility. We denote the equilibrium utility for a consumer by U . After the contract is signed, a consumer, given his type , chooses a reporting strategy 0 ( ), and receives consumption c 1 0 j ; c 2 0 j . There are no private markets in which consumers can participate, and agents'actual consumption is equal to the allocated consumption.
We assume that intermediaries can trade bonds b among themselves. Without aggregate uncertainty the market for trades among intermediaries is very simple, and we describe it in this section as it is useful for later extensions to the case of aggregate uncertainty. We denote by q the price of a bond b in period t = 1 that pays one unit of consumption good in period 2. All intermediaries take this price as given. They also pay dividends d 1 ; d 2 to its owners. At t = 0, the intermediary invests 
In problem (3), an intermediary is maximizing pro…ts subject to three constraints. Constraint (4) is a budget constraint that requires that payments to consumers (c 1 ( ) ; c 2 ( )), payments of
, and net payments on bonds are feasible. Constraint (5) states that the expected utility of an agent is higher than an equilibrium level of utility. Finally, constraint (6) is an incentive compatibility constraint that states that an agent receives higher utility from truthfully announcing his type rather than announcing any other type 0 . In equilibrium, competition among intermediaries forces them to have zero pro…ts. We now de…ne a competitive equilibrium.
De…nition 1 A competitive equilibrium CE 2 is a set of allocations fc 1 ( ) ; c 2 ( )g; a price q, dividends fd 1 ; d 2 g ; bond trades b, and a utility level U such that (i) intermediaries choose ffc 1 ( ) ; c 2 ( )g; fd 1 ; d 2 g ; bg to solve problem (3) taking q and U as given;
(ii) consumers choose a contract that o¤ ers them the highest ex-ante utility;
(iii) the aggregate feasibility constraint (2) holds;
(iv) …rms make zero pro…ts;
It is easy to show that, in equilibrium, 1=q =R and
4.2 Characterization and relationship to an unconstrained problem SP 1 and to a constrained e¢ cient problem SP
Intermediaries operate on competitive markets and, therefore, maximize an ex ante expected utility of agents. We can immediately see that the problem of the intermediary (3) in a competitive equilibrium is dual to the problem:
s.t. feasibility (2) and incentive compatibility (6) hold.
Problem (7) is a de…nition of a particular notion of constrained e¢ ciency which we denote by SP 2 . In this problem, a planner receives reports from the agents of their types and provides a menu of consumption allocations fc 1 ( ) ; c 2 ( )g to maximize expected utility of an agent subject to incentive compatibility and feasibility constraints. The only informational friction that this planner faces is unobservability of consumer types .
The above result that constrained e¢ cient allocations coincide with the competitive equilibrium does not mean that there is perfect risk sharing as the allocations in the problem SP 2 have to satisfy the incentive compatibility constraints. It is useful to de…ne an unconstrained problem SP 1 in which types of agents are observable. In that program the social planner does not face any constraints except for feasibility, i.e., maximizes the objective function in the problem (7) subject to (2) . Obviously, the problem of SP 1 is weakly less restrictive than problem SP 2 . Therefore, the welfare achieved in SP 1 is weakly higher than welfare achieved in SP 2 .
We summarize characterization of the solution to the problem (7) and, therefore, the solution of the problem (3) in the proposition that follows. The result is similar to Prescott and Townsend (1984) and Allen and Gale (2004) .
Proposition 1 (Optimum and competitive equilibrium with observable consumption) Let c 1 ( ) and c 2 ( ) be equilibrium allocations in De…nition 1. Then competitive equilibrium CE 2 is constrained e¢ cient, i.e., solves problem SP 2 . Moreover, 8 2 :
1. If preferences are discount shocks, as in the example 1;
2. If preferences are liquidity shocks, as in the example 2;
3. If preferences are valuation-neutral shocks, as in the example 3,
Proof. In the appendix. The intuition for the wedge in parts 1 and 2 of the above proposition is as follows. Consider, for example, the case of liquidity shocks. An agent with a low liquidity shock, high , has an incentive to report a high liquidity shock, low , to receive a higher consumption in period 1. A wedge (implicit tax) between the …rst and the second period consumption relaxes the incentive constraint by making such deviations more costly. We can contrast the result above with the case where the shocks are public information, the solution to the problem SP 1 . In that case, there is no intertemporal wedge, and the Euler equation holds with equality. The case of the valuationpreferences in Part 3 of the proposition is special as the incentive compatibility constraint (6) does not bind. For such preferences, the solution to the problem SP 1 coincides with the solution to the problem SP 2 , and there is no wedge in the intertemporal valuation for all types. 7 5 Competitive equilibrium with private markets
The allocations described in the previous section may not be achieved if agents can engage in transactions on markets. Allen (1985) and Jacklin (1987) were the …rst to point out that the possibility of such trades may restrict or even lead to a complete elimination of risk sharing. In this section we de…ne and characterize a competitive equilibrium allocation in the presence of private markets. 8 We …rst argue, as in Jacklin (1987) and Allen and Gale (2004) , that without regulations …nancial intermediaries provide no risk sharing. Unlike the previous literature we then identify a precise reason for the absence of insurance, an externality, that, as we show in the sections that follow, can be corrected by liquidity regulations.
Private market
We model unobservability of consumption using the setup of private markets as follows. Consider an environment in which all consumers have access to a market in which they can trade assets among themselves unobservably 9 . Formally, suppose that consumers are o¤ered a menu of contracts fc 1 ( ) ; c 2 ( )g. We model private markets as an endowment economy where endowments are allocations that agents receive (possibly by misrepresenting their types). A consumer treats the contract and the equilibrium interest rate R on the private market as given and, given his type , chooses his optimal reporting strategy 0 that determines his endowment of consumption c 1 0 ; c 2 0 . Unlike in the environment without private markets, actual after-trade consumption fx 1 ( ) ; x 2 ( )g may di¤er from the consumption speci…ed in the contract, since it is impossible to preclude a consumer from borrowing and lending the amount s ( ) on the private market. It can be easily shown that a consumer trades only a risk free security s ( ) and solves: 7 Note that not every utility function of the form û (c1)+(1 )û (c2) would imply that the incentive compatibility does not bind. For example, if we did not normalize byR and in our de…niton of value neutral preferences (1), and instead had u (c1; c2; ) = c 1 1
the solution of the problem SP 2 would feature a wedge in the intertemporal valuation, and the incentive compatibility constraint would bind. 8 An alternative interpretation of the assumption of the private markets is non-exclusivity by which we mean that it is impossible for an intermediary to observe or control transactions of a consumer with other intermediaries. 9 All our analysis is easily extended to the case in which agents can trade not only among themselves but also with other intermediaries. This case would bring this model closer to an interpretation as an environment of non-exclusive contracts. Key assumption that allows us to extend our results to that case is that portfolios of the intermediary (investment in short and long assets) are observable while transactions with individual consumers are not observable. Our choice of modelling side trades as private markets allows us to economize on notation without a¤ecting the substance of the results.
s.t. 8i:
We denote the value of this problem byṼ (fc 1 ( ) ; c 2 ( )g ; R; ). We denote by 0 ( ) the reporting strategy that the agent chooses in the problem above.
An equilibrium in the private market requires that in each period the total endowment of consumption goods be equal to the total after trade consumption for t = 1; 2:
Conditional on reports , the private market economy is a standard endowment economy. Therefore, aggregate endowments R c 1 0 dF ( ) and R c 2 0 dF ( ) determine the interest rate R. We now de…ne equilibrium in the private market.
De…nition 2 An equilibrium in the private market given the pro…le of contracts fc 1 ( ) ; c 2 ( )g consists of an interest rate R; and, for each agent : strategies 0 ( ), and allocations fx 1 ( ) ; x 2 ( ) ; s ( )g such that (i) consumers solve problem (8) taking ffc 1 ( ) ; c 2 ( )g ; Rg as given;
(ii) the feasibility constraints on the private market (11) are satis…ed.
We assume that for any menu of contract fc 1 ( ) ; c 2 ( )g that is o¤ered there exists a unique equilibrium.
Competitive equilibrium with private markets CE
3
In the presence of private markets, intermediaries need to take into account, in addition to un- 
The …rst constraint in the intermediary's problem is the budget constraint. The second constraint is incentive compatibility that states that, given interest rates R, consumers choose to truthfully reveal their types. The last constraint states that the intermediary cannot o¤er a contract which delivers a lower expected utility than the equilibrium utility U from the contracts o¤ered by other intermediaries. In equilibrium, all intermediaries act identically and make zero pro…ts. The intermediary's problem in this economy is very similar to that in the economy with observable trades. The only di¤erence comes from the fact that the incentive constraint (14) takes into account side trades that are not observable. The de…nition of the competitive equilibrium is parallel to that in the economy with observable trades.
De…nition 3 A competitive equilibrium CE 3 is a set of allocations fc 1 ( ) ; c 2 ( )g; a price q, dividends fd 1 ; d 2 g ; bond trades b, utility U , and the interest rate on the private market R such that (i) intermediaries choose ffc 1 ( ) ; c 2 ( )g; fd 1 ; d 2 g ; bg to solve problem (12) taking q; R; and U as given;
(ii) consumers choose the contract that o¤ ers them the highest ex-ante utility;
(iv) the private market, given the menus fc 1 ( ) ; c 2 ( )g, is in equilibrium, and R is an equilibrium price;
(v) …rms make zero pro…ts;
(vi) bonds markets clear, b = 0.
First, we show a straightforward lemma that the incentive compatibility constraint (14) takes the form of equalizing present value of intertemporal allocations across periods because, otherwise, an agent would pretend to claim a type that gives a higher present value of allocations and engage in trades on the private markets to achieve desired consumption allocations.
Lemma 1 An allocation of consumptions satis…es incentive compatibility constraint (14) i¤
Let us rewrite the problem of the intermediary in a more manageable form by considering its dual, simplifying incentive compatibility constraint using Lemma 1, and using the fact that
s.t. (16) and
It is easy to see that the interest rates on the markets for trades among intermediaries must be equal to the return on the production technology, so that 1=q =R. We now argue that R =R;
otherwise, arbitrage opportunities are created. For example, suppose that R <R, i.e., an interest rate on the private market is lower than R. An intermediary then chooses to invest only in the long asset and sets R c 2 ( ) R dF ( ) = e and R c 1 ( ) dF ( ) = 0. Consumers then can borrow on the private market at the interest rate R that is lower than the technological rate of returnR available to the intermediary. Therefore, the only price that can be an equilibrium price is R =R so that intermediaries do not engage in arbitrage. We can summarize this reasoning in the following proposition.
Proposition 2 (Absence of risk-sharing without regulations) Let R denote equilibrium price on the private market corresponding to the competitive equilibrium in De…nition 3. Then
The only allocation that competitive markets can achieve in such an economy is an autarcic allocation in which the present values of endowments evaluated atR are equated across di¤ erent types:
This proposition implies that there is complete absence of risk sharing as in Jacklin (1987) it as an externality that we show in the next section can be corrected by a government intervention.
Optimal liquidity requirements
In this section we show that there exists an intervention -a liquidity requirement -imposed on intermediaries that improves upon the competitive equilibrium allocation. We then determine the best (optimal) liquidity requirement. We show how the form of the optimal liquidity adequacy depends on the nature of the shocks that agents experience. Finally, we show that the best liquidity requirement implements a particular notion of constrained e¢ cient allocations. The key concept in this section is that a manipulation of liquidity leading to changes in the interest rate on private markets, may lead to an improvement of risk sharing even in the presence of trading possibilities by agents contrasting with the results of Jacklin (1987) and Allen and Gale (2004).
De…nition and e¤ects of a liquidity requirement
A liquidity requirement is a constraint imposed on all intermediaries, i.e., a constraint on the problem (12) that requires that investment in the short asset for any intermediary should be higher (lower) than a level i
We call a liquidity requirement a liquidity cap if (19) is imposed with less or equal sign. A liquidity cap stipulates the maximal amount of the short asset that an intermediary can hold. We call a liquidity requirement a liquidity ‡oor if (19) is imposed with a greater or equal sign. A liquidity ‡oor stipulates the minimal amount of the short asset that an intermediary can hold. An attractive feature of the liquidity requirement is that it does not require a regulator to observe individual contracts c 1 ( ) -only an aggregate portfolio allocation of the intermediaries needs to be observed.
We now intuitively describe the e¤ects that a binding liquidity requirement has on the interest rate on private markets. Letĉ 1 ( ) be the allocation of consumption that arises in an equilibrium without government intervention in De…nition 3. Suppose that a liquidity ‡oor i is set higher than the amount of aggregate liquidity provided by competitive markets:
When a liquidity ‡oor is imposed, the aggregate endowment in the private markets in the …rst period R c 1 ( ) dF ( ) is equal to i rather than{. Recall that private trading markets in which agents participate after receiving their allocation from the intermediaries are an endowment economy. The liquidity ‡oor increases the …rst period aggregate endowment in the private market (and, correspondingly, decreases the second period endowment) and, therefore, lowers the interest rate R such that R <R. Imposing a binding liquidity cap has the opposite e¤ect as it lowers the …rst period aggregate endowment and, therefore, increases R such that R >R.
The mechanism by which a liquidity requirement a¤ects the interest rate on the private markets is a key to understanding the main idea behind how our model works. In the absence of regulations, it is impossible for the interest rate R on the private market to di¤er fromR. As we showed in Proposition 2, an intermediary would engage in arbitrage and would not internalize possible adverse e¤ects that such arbitrage has on the provision of incentives and risk-sharing in the economy. The liquidity requirement puts a limit on the minimal (maximal) …rst period payments (liquidity) an intermediary can make and limits arbitrage by intermediaries.
Why may it be the case that, for example, a decrease in the private market interest rate (that corresponds to a binding liquidity ‡oor i >{) improves welfare and risk sharing? There are two e¤ects of decreasing the private market interest rate. First, it is clear that a decrease in R belowR decreases welfare as it introduces an intertemporal wedge in the marginal utilities of agents. There is also a second e¤ect. Recall that unobservability of agents'types and possibility of trades require that agents of various types receive the same present value of consumption evaluated at the private market interest rate R:
For a given level of the present value of consumption, a regulator has a policy instrument -changing the interest rate. Therefore, the amount of resources evaluated at the real rate of return may di¤er across agents
A change in the interest rate leads to a relative redistribution of resources from the …rst to the second period which may bene…t an agent who derives a higher utility from a given present value of consumption streams and lead to an improvement in the ex-ante welfare. Competitive markets lack this additional instrument because of arbitrage and the fact that each individual …rm cannot set the interest rate. A regulator, however, can a¤ect the interest rate and achieve allocations better than autarcic allocations achieved by the markets. We show next how the exact form of the liquidity requirement and a corresponding direction of the private market interest rate change depend on the form of agents'preferences.
Optimal liquidity regulations
We …rst simplify the problem of characterizing an equilibrium with a liquidity adequacy requirement. Let V (I; R; ) = max
subject to
be the ex-post indirect utility of an investor of type if her income is I, and the interest rate on the private market is R. Denote by x u 1 (I; R; ) and x u 2 (I; R; ) the uncompensated demand functions in this problem.
It is easy to see that the problem of …nding an optimal liquidity requirement is to choose the interest rate R and income I to maximize the expected indirect utility of agents subject to feasibility constraints.
subject to Z x u 1 (I; R; ) +
where I = x u 1 (I; R; )+ x u 2 (I; R; ) R is the ex-post market value of allocations. Note that the incentive compatibility that requires an agent not to misrepresent his type and not to engage in the trades on private markets implies that the same net present value of allocations, I, evaluated at the interest rate R has to be given to agents of di¤erent types as, otherwise, an agent would always prefer to claim a higher income.
We now analyze two key …rst order conditions that characterize problem (22) . Consider the …rst order condition of this program with respect to income I: 
and the …rst order condition for the interest rate R :
where we denote by a multiplier on (23), by x u 1;I and x u 2;I the derivatives of the uncompensated demands with respect to I, and by x u 1;R and x u 2;R derivatives of uncompensated demands with respect to R.
We manipulate these conditions (proof in the appendix) to obtain a characterization of the optimal wedge between the interest rate on the private market and the return on savings.
Proposition 3 (Optimal Wedge) Let I and R be solutions to the problem of …nding the optimal liquidity adequacy requirement (22) . Then R satis…es
x u 2 (I ;R ; ) R 2 o R x c 2;R (I ; R ; )dF + Cov n x u 2;I (I ; R ; );
where x c 2;R is a compensated demand in problem (22) .
Formula (26) characterizes the optimal wedge between the interest rate R and the rate of return on savingsR in terms of easily interpretable parameters such as indirect utility functions, uncompensated and compensated demands and the properties of the distribution of shocks. This formula also provides intuition for the result that we prove next that relates the form of the shocks that agents experience to the optimal liquidity adequacy requirement.
First, we describe the intuition for the form of the numerator of the wedge in equation (26) .
Consider …rst the case of liquidity shocks. The regulator wants to allocate a higher amount of lifetime consumption to agents with a higher lifetime value of income, i.e., to those with lower , implying that V I; (I; R ; ) < 0. An agent with low , for a given level of income I, prefers a lower consumption in the second period. The covariance between V I (I; R ; ) and x u 2 (I; R ; ), is, therefore, negative. The intuition for this case is as follows. For a given level of income, a decrease in the interest rate allows agents with low to consume more in the …rst period and yield a higher lifetime value. We show in the Theorem that follows that an interest rate R <R allows the regulator to allocate more resources to agents with higher consumption opportunities.
A simpler and less technical intuition is that of controlling a joint deviation: a deviating agent wants to pretend to have lower and then save to consume in period two a larger amount than a truth-telling agent. A decrease in the interest rate, therefore, negatively a¤ects a deviating agent more than a truth-telling agent and relaxes incentive constraints.
The interpretation of the numerator in (26) for the case of discount shocks is similar. The planner's value of income is higher for agents with a higher who prefer to consume their endowment in the second period, therefore, the covariance in the numerator is positive. The intuition for this case is as follows. For a given level of income, an increase in the interest rate allows agents with high to consume more in the second period and yield a higher lifetime value. We show in the Theorem that follows that an interest rate R >R, therefore, allows the regulator to allocate more resources to agents with better consumption opportunities. As in the case of liquidity shocks a simpler intuition is that of controlling a joint deviation: a deviating agent wants to pretend to have higher and then borrow to consume in period two a larger amount than a truth-telling agent. An increase in the interest rate, therefore, negatively a¤ects a deviating agent more than a truth-telling agent and relaxes incentive constraints.
For the case of the valuation-neutral preferences the intuition is simple, as, at the optimum with observable consumption, agents do not want to retrade, hence, the optimum with and without unobservable consumptions coincide. Now we turn our attention to the denominator of (26) . It is clear that x c 2;R (I; R; ) > 0 -a standard property of compensated demand functions. However, the sign of Cov n x u 2;I (I; R; ); 
The lemma that follows shows two natural cases in which Assumption 2 holds.
Lemma 2 Assumption 2 holds under the conditions that follow.
1. Preferences are homothetic. Proof. In the appendix. Now we use Assumption 2 and Proposition 3 to derive a theorem that characterizes the optimal liquidity adequacy requirement.
Theorem 1 (Optimal liquidity adequacy requirements) Let R be the interest rate associated with the optimal liquidity requirement, i.e, a solution to (22) . Suppose Assumption 2 holds. 3. If preferences are valuation-neutral shocks, then R =R. No regulations are needed. Moreover, the solution to the optimal problem SP 2 without private markets, solution to the problem of the optimal liquidity adequacy requirement (22) , and the solution to the competitive equilibrium with private markets CE 3 coincide.
Proof. In the appendix.
Theorem 1 is one of the central results of the paper and provides a characterization of the optimal liquidity adequacy requirement and the associated interest rate on the private markets depending on the nature of the shocks (liquidity or discount factor shocks) that agents experience.
The theorem states the form of the optimal liquidity requirement and shows that competitive markets for liquidity are ine¢ cient. Importantly, we show that whether markets provide too little liquidity and too much investment in the long asset (as in the case of liquidity shocks) or too much liquidity and too little investment in the long asset (as in the case of discount shocks) depends on the structure of the environment, speci…cally, on the form of shocks a¤ecting agents.
The technical reason for the failure of the welfare theorem that we proved in Theorem 1 is an externality that each …nancial intermediary faces. When intermediaries allocate consumption to agents, they do not take into account how such allocations a¤ect interest rates on the private market. We can see that the interest rate enters the production set of each intermediaries in equation (14) . An imposition of a liquidity regulation and a corresponding change in the private market interest rate partially corrects such externality and leads to improvement in welfare. This externality can be called a "pecuniary externality" as it operates through price (interest rate) on the private markets. The reason why such an externality has e¤ects on the welfare is because our environment is that of private information. 10 6.3 Optimal liquidity adequacy requirements implements the social optimum with retrading SP
3
A natural question arises after reading the previous section whether the optimal liquidity adequacy requirement is the best regulation within a particular class of regulations (i.e., within the class of liquidity adequacy requirements). It may be the case that there exists another, perhaps more complicated, regulation scheme that achieves superior allocations given constraints imposed by unobservability of types and possibility of hidden trades. In this section, we show that a competitive equilibrium with optimal liquidity requirement implements the constrained e¢ ciency that we call SP 3 , i.e., achieves the highest possible welfare given these two informational frictions.
We …rst formally de…ne the constrained e¢ cient problem SP 3 . Consider a social planner that cannot observe or shut down trades on private markets and cannot observe agents' types. The di¤erence with the problem SP 2 is that, in addition to the private information faced by SP 2 , planner SP 3 faces constraints that agents may trade on the private market. The social planner SP 3 chooses the allocations fc 1 ( ) ; c 2 ( )g that maximize the ex ante utility of consumers. The revelation principle shows that, without loss of generality, the social planner can o¤er a contract fc 1 ( ) ; c 2 ( )g so that all consumers choose to report their types truthfully to the planner and do not trade on the private market. It is easy to show that the social planner can a¤ect the return on trades among agents by allocating di¤erent amount of aggregate consumption across time.
A constrained e¢ cient allocation fc 1 ( ) ; c 2 ( )g is the solution to the problem SP 3 given by:
where R is the equilibrium interest rate on the private market, given the pro…le of endowments
It is important to note two features of the incentive compatibility constraint (30) . First, it is at least as tight as the constraint with observable consumption (6) . The reason is that the planner has to ensure that, in addition to truthful revelation of types, consumers do not engage in trades on the private markets. Second, the right hand side of the incentive compatibility constraint depends on the whole vector of endowments fc 1 ( ) ; c 2 ( )g for all consumers in the economy, not just for the individual consumer . We showed that the interest rate actually depends on the relative amount of aggregate consumption provided by the planner in the …rst period versus the aggregate amount of consumption provided in the second period.
We now show that the optimal liquidity adequacy requirement is the best regulation that can be achieved given the informational frictions of unobservability of types and trades among agents.
The theorem that follows proves that our focus on just one class of regulations -liquidity adequacy requirements -is not restrictive.
Theorem 2 (Optimal liquidity requirement is e¢ cient)
The optimal liquidity adequacy requirement implements the constrained e¢ cient allocation which solves SP 3 , i.e. solutions to problems (22) and (28) coincide.
Proof. In the appendix. rather than locally improving regulation. As we show below on the two important special cases that we solve analytically, the welfare gain of …nding the optimal regulation may be signi…cant.
Two closed-form examples
The results derived in Theorem 1 provide a general characterization of the form of optimal liquidity requirement depending on the form of the preferences. In this section we consider two cases for which we derive a closed form characterization of the optimum that further characterizes the optimal liquidity requirement in terms of underlying parameters. The …rst case is an example in which the utility of consumption is logarithmic. The second case is an environment of Diamond and Dybvig (1983).
Log case
We further extend Proposition 3 and Theorem 1 by providing a closed form solution for the case of a logarithmic utility function. The reason why logarithmic utility allows a closed form solution is because wealth and substitution e¤ects of changing an interest rates cancel, and formulas for compensated and uncompensated demands, indirect utility functions and their derivatives have an easy algebraic form. With a more general utility function, equation (26) that provides an optimal wedge between R and R becomes more complicated and does not allow a closed form solution.
Assume preferences are of a form nesting those in examples 1; 2 and 3:
u(x 1 ; x 2 ; ) = 1 log(x 1 ) + 2 log(x 2 ); with = ( 1 ; 2 ). Speci…cally, for the case of discount shocks 1 = 1, 2 = ; for the case of liquidity shocks 1 = 1= , 2 = 1; ; for the case of valuation-neutral shocks 1 = 1 , 2 = .
We leave the algebraic manipulations to the appendix and derive the following proposition.
Proposition 4 (Closed form solution for the logarithmic case) Assume thatû = log (c). Then the optimal liquidity requirement i and the interest rate R associated with it are given as follows.
1. Suppose preferences are discount factor shocks. The liquidity requirement is a liquidity cap.
Moreover,
2. Suppose preferences are liquidity shocks. The liquidity requirement is a liquidity ‡oor. Moreover,
3. If preferences are value neutral, R =R.
This proposition is important as it gives a complete closed form solution to the problem of …nding an optimal liquidity adequacy requirement. The interpretation of the solution is also simple.
Consider the formulas for R for either the case of liquidity shocks of discount shocks. In the absence of the second term, in these formulas the interest rate R =R. This second term measures the value of the distortion introduced by private information and trades in the …nancial markets and depends on the form of preferences and the distribution of shocks.
We also derived a closed form solution for the welfare gain of imposing the optimal liquidity adequacy requirement as a Corollary to the Proposition above.
Corollary 1 (Welfare gain of optimal liquidity adequacy requirement). If the utility function is logarithmic, the welfare gain of imposing optimal liquidity requirement, i.e., the di¤ erence in ex-ante utility between the solutions to problem SP 3 and CE 3 is given as follows.
In the liquidity shocks model
In the discount shocks model
Calculations such as the one above stress importance of …nding optimal rather than locally improving regulations as the optimum can lead to signi…cant welfare gain .
Diamond-Dybvig preferences
In this section we provide a closed form solution to the optimal problem of …nding the optimal liquidity adequacy requirement for the setup considered by Diamond and Dybvig (1983) and Jacklin (1987). This environment is widely used in the literature on the …nancial intermediation. These preferences are, however, special as the unconstrained solution (without private information) coincides with the solution to the optimum with private information about agent's types but without private markets. In our notation, the solutions to SP 1 and SP 2 are identical. Jacklin (1987) showed that when agents can freely engage in trades the competitive market allocation features no risk sharing and has interest rate on the private market R equal toR -this is analogue of our Proposition 2 for the environment we considered. Jacklin (1987) and Allen and Gale (2004) conclude that it is impossible to achieve any allocation other than the autarky. The new result that we present here is that, for the case of the Diamond-Dybvig preferences, liquidity regulations can improve upon competitive market allocation and, in fact, the solution with optimal liquidity adequacy requirement coincides with the unconstrained allocation, SP 1 . We present an analytical solution for such optimal regulation, the liquidity ‡oor, and for the interest rate on the private market associated with it.
Suppose there are two type of agents denoted by 2 f0; 1g: Let be the fraction of agents of type = 0: Preferences for agent of type are given by
where u is twice continuously di¤erentiable, increasing, strictly concave, and satis…es Inada conditions u 0 (0) = +1 and u 0 (+1) = 0: Also, we assume as in Diamond and Dybvig (1983) that the coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion is everywhere greater than 1 cu 00 (c) u 0 (c) 1 for all c 0:
We start with the analysis of the benchmark problem in which there are no private markets analogously to Section 4. It is easy to show that as in Proposition 1 the competitive equilibrium allocation implements the constrained e¢ cient allocation without private markets. The constrained e¢ cient allocation SP 2 solves the following problem:
s.t.
As noted by Diamond and Dybvig (1983) , the incentive compatibility constraints are not binding at the optimum, so that the unconstrained allocation is attained, i.e., the allocation that we call SP 1 in which there is no private information, and incentive compatibility constraints (33) and 
To verify that this allocation satis…es incentive compatibility, we need only check that c 2 (1) c 1 (0), which follows from R > 1:
Now we turn to the analysis of the e¤ects of private markets that is similar to our Section 5.
First, consider competitive equilibrium with private markets. Reasoning paralleling that in the Proposition 2 shows that the equilibrium interest rate on the private markets is equal toR and that no risk sharing is achieved: agents's present value of consumption evaluated at the interest rateR is equated across di¤erent types. This is a result shown by Jacklin (1987) .
We show that optimal liquidity requirement allows to change the interest rate on the private market, implements the optimal program SP 3 which in turns coincides with the unconstrained optimum SP 1 and with constrained e¢ cient allocation with private types but no hidden trades.
The analysis closely follows Section 6.2 and proofs of Proposition 3 and Theorem 1. In the appendix, we provide the algebra that gives the closed form solution for the optimal interest rate R as a solution to the following equation:
We can implement the solution with a ‡oor i on the holdings of short term assets given by
Moreover, in the case u(c) = log(c); we have R = R : We collect the results of this section in the following proposition. (a) The interest rate associated with such optimal liquidity regulation is given by (38).
(b) If the utility function is logarithmic, then the interest rate associated with the optimal liquidity regulation is given by R = R .
The intuition behind this proposition highlights the key forces behind our model. Consider the case of logarithmic utility. In the competitive market, the only possible equilibrium interest rate on the private market is R =R as each individual …nancial intermediary would engage in arbitrage if R were di¤erent fromR. The competitive equilibrium allows no risk sharing as the possibility of engaging in trades on …nancial markets leads to equalization of incomes I of agents of di¤erent types, and these incomes are evaluated with the interest rateR. Now consider how the competitive market allocation can be improved. Imposing a liquidity ‡oor increases the amount of …rst-period endowment on the private market and decreases the interest rate R <R. This relaxes incentive compatibility constraints. A short, nontechnical intuition is as follows. Consider a possible deviation in this model: an agent of type 1 can claim to be an agent of type 0 and then save to consume in the second period. At the interest rate R = R , an agent of type 1 does not …nd it pro…table to engage in such deviation. 11 It is easy to calculate the welfare gain of imposing the optimal liquidity adequacy requirement. Corollary 2 (Welfare gain of optimal liquidity adequacy requirement). Consider the setup of Diamond and Dybvig (1983) . If the utility function is logarithmic, the welfare gain of imposing optimal liquidity requirement, i.e., the di¤ erence in ex-ante utility between the solutions to problem SP 3 and CE 3 , is given by
This corollary again stresses the importance of studying optimal rather than local liquidity adequacy requirements as potential welfare gains can be quite large.
Extensions
In this section we consider three extensions of the model described above: introducing aggregate shocks, modelling an environment with idiosyncratic shocks to …nancial intermediaries, and considering direct access to intertemporal technology by agents.
Aggregate shocks
It is easy to extend the model to the case in which the economy experiences aggregate shocks to e andR that are known in period t = 0. Suppose that there are N aggregate states = f1; 2; ::; N g and the state is observable. We denote the probability of these states occurring as ( ). We notice that it is technologically impossible for the society to transfer resources across aggregate states.
Therefore, the problem with aggregate shocks can be reduced to solving N independent problems described in case without aggregate shocks and is, essentially, a comparative statics exercise.
The case of the logarithmic utility is again the simplest case that allows us to completely characterize the solution. Consider equations (64) and (65). An aggregate shock either to endowment e or to the returnR can be studied as comparative statics with respect to e andR.
We can easily see that for the case of the aggregate endowment shocks, the interest rate on the private market does not depend on the realization of the aggregate shock -R ( ) is constant. Let's de…ne by liquidity requirement in a ratio form, i r ( ), a constraint on a problem of a competitive …rm that stipulates either a maximal or minimal proportion of the total assets invested in a short asset R c 1 ( ) dF ( ) =e for the realization of the aggregate shock ; and R ( ) de…ne corresponding interest rate on the private market. Then i r ( ) is constant for all . In fact, it is easy to show that this result also holds for the utilityû(c) = : The case of the shocks to the rate of return is equally simple. It is easy to show that i r ( ) and R ( ) =R ( ) are constant for all :
Idiosyncratic shocks to intermediaries and interbank markets
In this section we discuss an extension of the model to the case in which intermediaries experience idiosyncratic observable shocks. We show that if there are complete interbank markets then this model reduces to the case described in previous sections in which all intermediaries are identical.
The intuition for this result is simple: in period 0, intermediaries can trade bonds with the payo¤ contingent on the shocks realized in period 1. We illustrate the result on the case without aggregate uncertainty in which intermediaries face return shocks.
Formally, we proceed as follows. At time t = 1, an intermediary can face a rate of return shock n 2 f1; :::; N g with probability n under which the return on the long asset isR (n). We assume that there is no aggregate uncertainty and that
At time 0 there are interbank markets in which intermediaries trade N Arrow securities. The price of each security is q n . The security pays 1 if state n occurs and 0 otherwise. Prices q n are determined by a market clearing condition. It is immediate to see that intermediaries choose to fully insure themselves at t = 0 against idiosyncratic shocks. The problem of each intermediary then reduces to the case of no idiosyncratic shocks described above.
Direct access to technology
Another variation of our setup would be the case in which some agents have access to technology that yieldsR directly without the need for …nancial intermediaries while other agents need an intermediary to access the technology. If we modi…ed our assumption that all activities at the intermediary level is observable and instead supposed that a regulator could observe aggregate amount of investment in the technology yieldingR, then our results would also hold. The constrained optimum in that model would be implemented by a linear tax on returns to investment of those who can access the technology and by liquidity adequacy requirement on the …nancial intermediaries serving liquidity needs of agents who can not access the technology.
Conclusion
In this paper we provided a novel theoretical mechanism how manipulation of aggregate liquidity via regulation of …nancial intermediaries in the presence of markets can provide risk sharing while competitive markets reach only autarcic allocations. A change in the interest rate on the private markets that is generated by a liquidity requirement can be used as an instrument to improve ex-ante welfare when agents have unobservable types and can trade in private markets. Moreover, the best liquidity adequacy requirement is the best regulation as it implements the constrained e¢ cient allocation subject to unobservable types and hidden trades. We provided a tight analytical characterization of the problem of the optimal liquidity requirement and the optimal wedge between the interest rate on the private market and the rate of marginal rate of transformation. A liquidity requirement is a simple tool that can be used by policymakers to regulate liquidity provision.
Depending on the types of shocks, liquidity or discount shocks, that agents or …rms in the economy experience, we provide conditions under which the regulator should use either a liquidity cap or a liquidity ‡oor. Importantly, for a general speci…cation of preferences, we derived a characterization of the form of the optimal liquidity requirement and also provided closed form solutions for two important cases.
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1
Because of the single crossing condition in Assumption 1; we can rewrite the problem (7) in the following form:
We assume that there is no bunching and drop constraint (42). In problem (40), attach multipliers to (41), to (43) and form the following Lagrangian:
Integrating by parts we can rewrite (44) as
The …rst order conditions for c 1 ( ) and c 2 ( ) are
Combining (45) and (46), we …nd
Economically, condition
> 0 means that incentive constraints bind downward at ;
< 0 means that they bind upward. It is straightforward to show that incentive constraints in (40) bind upward if preferences are as in example 1, and downward if preferences are as in example 2: It is also easy to check that the incentive compatibility constraint does not bind for the value neutral preferences.
Some properties of problem (20) used in the proofs
Denote by the Lagrange multiplier on (21). The envelope theorem implies that:
Combining two of the above equations we get:
Di¤erentiating the budget constraint (21) with respect to income I we obtain: 
Proof of Proposition 3
We can re-express (25) using (49) and (52) as
Rewrite (53) to obtain
Rewrite (24) to obtain R (V I (I; R; ) ) dF R x u 2;I (I; R; )dF
Combine (54) and (55)
Hence, R fV I (I; R; ) g dF is equal to Z fV I (I; R; ) g x u 2 (I; R; ) R 2 dF R n x u 2;I (I; R; ) o dF R n x u 2;R (I; R; )
which can be rearranged as 
This implies, …rst, that date 2 consumption is a normal good, so that x u 2;I (I; R; ) > 0: Second, it implies that Cov n x u 2;I (I; R; ); 
The Lemma follows.
Proof of Theorem 1
Assumption 1 ensures that We now show a lemma that determines how V I (I; R ; ) depends on preferences. Proof. We have V (I; R; ) = max
u(x 1 ; x 2 ; ) subject to
Suppose …rst that preferences are given by u(x 1 ) + u(x 2 ): Then, substituting x 1 using the budget constraint, we can rewrite this problem as V (I; R; ) = max For the value neutral preferences V I; = 0.
This proves the Lemma.
Proof of Theorem 2
Note that the incentive compatibility constraint can be rewritten as This proves the theorem.
Proof of Proposition 4
With the logarithmic utility, uncompensated demands, and the indirect utility function have a very simple form: 
The …rst order condition for I and R; respectively, are given by
where > 0 is a multiplier on the resource constraint (61).
Manipulating these …rst order conditions we obtain the closed form solution for the interest rate R associated with the optimal liquidity requirement:
where E represent the expectation with respect to F ( ).
We can also …nd the optimal level of the liquidity requirement. Using feasibility to substitute for I we obtain the optimal liquidity requirement i is given by: 
We now substitute for the 1 ; 2 for our three formulations of preferences and summarize the closed form solution in the proposition that follows.
Proof of Proposition 5
Consider the following consumption problem that gives the indirect utility of an agent who is allocated with income I and who can trade on the private markets with the interest rate R :
V (I; R; ) = max 
Denote by (x 1 (I; R; ); x 2 (I; R; )) the maximand of this problem.
The problem of …nding the best liquidity requirement is given by (this is analogue of problem 
(x 1 (I; R; 0) + x 2 (I; R; 0) R ) + (1 )(x 1 (I; R; 1) + x 2 (I; R; 1)
We want to verify that the unconstrained allocation solving SP 1 or SP 2 is a solution to the program (68) for the values of I and R de…ned below. Consider the following system in (I; R) u 0 (I) = R u 0 (RI);
I = e + (1 )
The result that (I; R) de…ned in (70) and (71) satisfy the …rst order conditions of both (31) and .
